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The Horror and the Pity: Phrikē as a Tragic Emotion1 
 
Douglas Cairns 
 
Abstract 
As well as being the name of the physical symptom of shivering, shuddering, or goosebumps, the 
Greek word phrikē names an emotion that is particularly associated with automatic responses to sudden 
visual or auditory stimuli. This makes it especially at home in a number of specialized (ritual and other) 
scenarios, and helps explain its recurrent role in the ancient Greek aesthetics and literary theory, a role 
that illustrates the importance of the visual and the physical in ancient theories of audiences’ emotional 
responses to the portrayal of suffering in both dramatic performance and non-dramatic narrative.  
 
In Sophocles’ Oedipus Tyrannus, once the true horror of what Oedipus has 
(unwittingly) done has become known, the Chorus sing a song (the fourth stasimon) 
in which they reflect on their king’s status as a paradigm of the instability of human 
happiness – if even someone like Oedipus, the saviour of his city, can rise so high 
only to fall so low, which of us is not vulnerable (1186-1222)? Oedipus’ own reaction 
to this horror is to blind himself, and his reappearance on stage, once he has done so, 
occasions this further reaction from the Chorus (OT 1297-1306):  
 
ὦ δεινὸν ἰδεῖν πάθος ἀνθρώποις, 
ὦ δεινότατον πάντων ὅσ’ ἐγὼ 
προσέκυρσ’ ἤδη. τίς σ’, ὦ τλῆμον, 
προσέβη μανία; τίς ὁ πηδήσας   1300 
μείζονα δαίμων τῶν μηκίστων 
πρὸς σῇ δυσδαίμονι μοίρᾳ; 
φεῦ φεῦ δύστην’, ἀλλ’ οὐδ’ ἐσιδεῖν 
δύναμαί σ’, ἐθέλων πόλλ’ ἀνερέσθαι, 
πολλὰ πυθέσθαι, πολλὰ δ’ ἀθρῆσαι·  1305 
τοίαν φρίκην παρέχεις μοι. 
 
What suffering, terrible for humans to see, most terrible of all that I have ever 
encountered! What madness came upon you, wretched one? What divine 
being was it that leapt further than the longest leap on top of your unhappy 
fate? Alas, poor man: I cannot even look at you, though there is much I want 
to ask, much to hear, and much to look at; such is the shiver (phrikē) you 
cause in me. 
 
The Chorus are still, as in their previous song, horrified by what that suffering 
represents, and they remain, fundamentally, sympathetic to Oedipus in his suffering. 
Yet Oedipus’ physical appearance makes a difference: the sight of the horrible 
mutilation that he has inflicted upon himself (represented in the new mask which the 
actor will have put on before re-emerging from the stage-building) elicits a new and 
more physical response, one that they call phrikē, shivering or shuddering. This 
response springs from a fascination with the spectacle that Oedipus now represents 
and yet also entails an instinctive revulsion towards that spectacle. Oedipus is, in a 
                                                 
1 I should like to thank the Leverhulme Trust, the Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung, and the European 
Research Council (via the University of Oxford project, The Social and Cultural Construction of 
Emotions: The Greek Paradigm, directed by Professor A. Chaniotis) for their support, as well as Jan 
Bremmer, Elizabeth Craik, David Levenson, Oliver Overwien, and Richard Smith for their advice and 
assistance. 
way, an object; but also an object of pity, a human being like the Chorus members 
themselves. The sight of Oedipus is important, but it is not merely this that excites the 
Chorus’ revulsion. They cannot bear to look at him (1303-4), but equally his entire 
pathos – not just the self-blinding, but the general catastrophe of which the self-
blinding is the latest, most physical, and most visible expression – is “terrible for 
humans to see” (1297).   
This scene is the point at which all the dense imagery of sight and blindness, 
light and darkness, insight and ignorance reaches its concrete, visual, and emotional 
climax, as the Oedipus who chose darkness over light as a way of avoiding sights too 
painful to contemplate (1371-90) nonetheless insists on making himself an object of 
the citizens’ visual attention (1287-9; see Cairns 1993, 217-18), and the Chorus 
express their fascination with the horror of a spectacle they cannot bring themselves 
to look upon, a fate they seek to understand but can barely begin to contemplate. In 
the conflicting and contradictory responses of both Oedipus and the Chorus, and 
especially in their fundamentally visual character, there is much that has been 
addressed in classic psychoanalytic readings,2 and much that could be taken further in 
approaches of that sort.  
What I intend to pursue in this paper, however, is not directly indebted to that 
school of interpretation, though I hope that it may in some ways prove 
complementary to it. Instead, my focus is on the specific nature of the Chorus’ 
emotional response, the phrikē that they experience on first setting eyes on the 
blinded king and in confronting his tragedy, the phrikē that makes them, momentarily, 
turn away.3 This, as we saw, is a response with a strong perceptual element; it is 
above all the sight of Oedipus in his present condition that triggers it. It is a 
spontaneous and instinctive reaction; but it is not merely a simple reflex, because its 
ideational content includes the Chorus’ attempt to encompass the sheer magnitude of 
Oedipus’ suffering, together with whatever superhuman or supernatural forces may 
have caused it. These sensory and cognitive aspects, however, essential though they 
may be for the specification of the emotion in these particular circumstances, do not 
suffice to make phrikē what it is – for phrikē is fundamentally a physical experience, 
the experience of a body that shivers and shudders. In this passage, then, phrikē is (a) 
a spontaneous response to a shocking visual stimulus; (b) an interpretation of a 
particular state of affairs in terms of specific evaluative norms; and (c) a corporeal 
experience. Eyes, mind, and body are all implicated: the Chorus look, reflect, and 
shudder. Simply calling their response phrikē goes a very long way towards 
specifying and recreating its phenomenological character, what it feels like to be 
moved as they are moved by Oedipus. Whether we ourselves see the play in the 
theatre or merely in our mind’s eye as we read, the response of this internal audience 
is, at least in this instance, a guide to our own.  
Phrikē can be the name of an emotion (see below), but its primary significance 
lies in its reference to a physical symptom that is common to a range of emotional and 
non-emotional events. It belongs, in its primary sense, to the basic somatic level of 
emotion. Sources such as the Hippocratic corpus, other medical writings, and the 
collections of Problemata attributed to Aristotle and Alexander of Aphrodisias all 
give ample evidence of its basic somatic aspect.4 In medical writers, phrikē is 
                                                 
2 See e.g. Devereux 1973, usefully supplemented by Buxton 1980.  
3 For a more comprehensive account of phrikē, see Cairns 2013. I am grateful to Léon Wurmser for 
giving me the opportunity to pursue in this paper issues that I was unable to consider in that study. 
4 Cf. Burkert 2010, 48-49. The Hippocratic corpus has 60 occurrences of the noun, phrikē, 36 of the 
verb, phrissein (cf. one instance of phrikazein), and 53 of the derivative adjective, phrikōdēs (plus one 
especially associated with fever and cold sweats.5 These sources are well-nigh 
unanimous in relating phrikē and its cognates to bodily temperature: we shudder when 
we are cold,6 and when we shudder or shiver in other circumstances (e.g. when we are 
afraid, when we are suffering from various physical ailments, when we sneeze, when 
we urinate, after eating, etc.) variations in bodily temperature are normally also 
implicated.7 For Galen, phrikē affects only the skin, whereas rhigos, “chill”, affects 
the whole body,8 illustrating a link between shuddering or shivering and piloerection 
(a vestigial phenomenon in humans) that is frequently noted elsewhere,9 and which 
can in turn provide a cue for comment on the occurrence of phrikē also in non-human 
animals, in both emotional and non-emotional scenarios.10 Phrikē, therefore, is an 
involuntary bodily movement, one that is part of human beings’ pre-human 
inheritance and rooted in basic systems of bodily regulation that respond to changes in 
the temperature of the organism and of the environment. As a symptom of emotion, 
and especially of fear-like emotions, it is a member of a set of related symptoms that 
are also recognized in our own folk models (“I shudder to think”, “it gives me the 
shivers’, “he was in a cold sweat”, ‘she’s got cold feet”, “it was a chilling/hair-raising 
experience”), and confirmed by empirical investigation.11 
                                                 
of the synonym, phrikaleos). In Galen, the figures are 110, 49, and 86 respectively. In the pseudo-
Aristotelian Problemata, see esp. Book 8 (887b10-889b9) on chill (rhigos) and shivering (phrikē – 9 
occurrences of the root; there are a further 25 occurrences elsewhere in the work). Cf. e.g. Hesiod, 
Works and Days 539-40; Plutarch, De primo frigido 947C for the fundamental association with bodily 
temperature. 
5 E.g. Hippocrates, Aphorisms 7. 4, On Diseases 1. 23-5; cf. Zink 1962, 19 n. 49; Berrettoni 1970, 262; 
Op de Hipt 1972, 210-11. 
6 It is, however, rhigos and not phrikē that is etymologically related to Latin frigeo, frigus (Chantraine 
1968-80, 1249). 
7 Cf. Berrettoni 1970, 263. Galen, however, insists on the existence of other causes, e.g. the application 
of bitter drugs (De tremore vii. 627. 11-629. 5 Kühn). He also distinguishes between phrikē and rhigos 
as symptoms of fear and as signs of physical cold (ibid., 628. 2-4); contrast [Aristotle], Problemata 
889a15-25, on the role of bodily temperature in the emotions of fear and anger. 
8 Galen, De tremore vii. 612. 9-12 Kühn; for Hippocrates, On Diseases 1. 24 the distinction is simply 
one of degree, phrikē being the milder reaction. Galen, however, also notes that “all other medical 
writers” use the terms interchangeably (De tremore vii. 611. 18-612. 4). Two late sources (Palladius, 
Synopsis de febribus 24 in Ideler 1841, 117-18; Theophilus and Stephanus of Athens, De febrium 
differentia in Sicurus 1862, 30-2) confirm Galen’s view of his fellow professionals; while ancient  
grammarians (Apollonius Sophista, Lexicon Homericum 138. 32; Hesychius ῥ 299-301) regularly use 
the two groups of terms interchangeably. 
9 E.g. [Aristotle], Physiognomonica 812b30, Problemata 888a38, 889a26, [Alexander of Aphrodisias], 
Problemata 2. 26; cf. [Theocritus] Idyll 25. 244, Plutarch fr. 73 Sandbach. Cf. the frequency of the 
association between “goosebumps’ (UK English goosepimples) and physical cold (as also with fever 
and other biological functions such as sneezing) in the studies of Schurtz et al. 2012. 
10 S. fr. 875 Radt, [Aristotle], Physiognomonica 812b30 (again), Nicander Theriaca 721, 727, Plutarch 
Aristides 18. 2 (developing the Homeric image by which weapons and the like bristle like the fur of an 
angry animal), Dio Chrysostom Oration 58. 4, Achilles Tatius 1. 12. 3, x 14 in Aelian, On the Nature 
of Animals, [Alexander of Aphrodisias], Problemata 4. 159. 
11 Specifically on symptoms of fear, see Darwin 1889, 70-71, 346-347 (trembling), 100-1, 104-105, 
291-292, 295-298 (piloerection), 291, 346-347 (temperature changes), with Ekman’s comments (in the 
1998 edition) and further reading where relevant; cf. Eibl-Eibesfeldt 1989, 371 (on piloerection), 479 
(on changes in skin temperature); Balcombe 2010, 48 (on changes in body and skin temperature as 
symptoms of fear and other emotions in humans and animals); cf. also Burkert 2010, 46. For low body 
temperature as a metonym for fear in various cultures, see Kövecses 2000, 5, 23-4; for a survey of 
psychological applications of words meaning warm and cold in Greek, see Zink 1962, esp. 15-30 on 
““Kälte” als Ausdruck einer unangenehmen Gefühlslage wie Schreck, Angst, Furcht, Entsetzen, 
Grauen”; cf. also Bouvier 2011. On the relation between actual physical temperature and the 
metaphorical concepts of emotional warmth and coldness, see Williams and Bargh 2008, Zhong and 
Leonardelli 2008. 
In Greek as in English, however, such terms are not restricted to the labelling 
of physical symptoms. In the language of emotion, it is typical for the physical 
symptom to be used as a metonym for the emotion with which it is associated. A large 
number of passages illustrate this with reference to phrikē in Greek, but the 
phenomenon is at its clearest when the verb phrissein, “to shudder”, governs a direct 
object in the same way as would a verb meaning “to fear”.12 Thus, in a famous 
passage, Helen contrasts the kindness of Hector with the horror that she occasions in 
the other Trojans (Iliad 24. 774-5): 13 
 
οὐ γάρ τίς μοι ἔτ’ ἄλλος ἐνὶ Τροίῃ εὐρείῃ 
ἤπιος οὐδὲ φίλος, πάντες δέ με πεφρίκασιν. 
 
For I no longer have anyone else in broad Troy who is gentle or kind – all the 
others shudder at me. 
 
That the verb phrissein in such locutions stands for a verb of fearing is particularly 
clear in Euripides’ Hippolytus (415-18), where Phaedra expresses her incredulity that 
an adulteress should be able to conceal her guilty conscience from her husband: 
 
 αἳ πῶς ποτ’, ὦ δέσποινα ποντία Κύπρι, 
  βλέπουσιν ἐς πρόσωπα τῶν ξυνευνετῶν 
  οὐδὲ σκότον φρίσσουσι τὸν ξυνεργάτην   
  τέραμνά τ’ οἴκων μή ποτε φθογγὴν ἀφῇ;  
 
How, oh Cyprian, mistress of the deep, can they look their husbands in the 
face and not shudder at the darkness, their partner in crime, or at the timbers of 
the house, lest they at some stage speak? 
 
The fact that phrissein is here followed not only by a direct object, but also by a noun 
clause of the sort that regularly specifies the propositional content of a verb of fearing 
indicates that ‘shudder” here is a simple metonymy for “fear”; shudders as such have 
no propositional content.14 
The importance of emotional symptoms in the construction of emotional 
concepts underlines the fundamental importance of physical embodiment in the 
concept of emotion itself. In the case of phrikē, the symptom is one that has its roots 
in basic somatic mechanisms of temperature regulation, that is manifested in a range 
of non-emotional contexts, and that is shared with other animals. From these 
materials, universal in humans and extending beyond the human species, is 
constructed an emotional concept in which physical symptoms are intimately related 
to cognitive appraisals and evaluations. The mechanism by which this occurs is the 
universal one of metonymy, by which the name of the symptom comes to function as 
                                                 
12 For this phenomenon, cf. Apollonius Dyscolus, De constructione 413. 5-415. 2. 
13 Cf. (among a large number of parallels) Aeschylus, Seven 720-1, Euripides, Cyclops 320, Hippolytus 
855, Sophocles, Antigone 997, Aristophanes, Clouds 1132-3. The same phenomenon is observable 
when the noun, phrikē, governs an objective genitive, as at Euripides, Ion 898, Plutarch, Timoleon 22. 
6. 
14 Cf. Odyssey 23. 216, where the verb in question is rhigein. The response on which Phaedra 
comments in the hypothetical adulteress, of course, involves a failure to experience the guilty fear of 
exposure that Phaedra herself would feel in such a situation; thus, though still a form of fear, phrikē is 
here implicated in a scenario that also encompasses prospective and retrospective shame. On this 
aspect of the wider context, see Cairns 1993, 321-40. 
a name of the emotion. The concept of phrikē is typical in locating the language and 
thought of emotion in embodied physical experience. There is nothing in any way 
surprising or unfamiliar about this – the point is precisely that ancient Greek 
emotional concepts are, to large extent, built up out of the same materials as our own, 
materials that draw on our experience as physically embodied beings interacting with 
our physical and social environments. What needs to be emphasized, however, is that 
this experiential, embodied nature of emotion is not just an aspect of a shared 
biological substratum; it is a feature also of language and of thought. It is not that 
embodiment is relevant only in terms of emotions’ physical changes, symptoms, and 
expressions and is left behind when emotional concepts take root in language, 
thought, and culture. There is no disjunction, but rather a fundamental continuity 
between emotions as physical experiences and emotional concepts as linguistic and 
cultural categories. In terms of the development of emotional concepts, there is no 
wedge to be driven between the body, on the one hand, and language and culture on 
the other. Attention to these wider aspects of emotion language (beyond the semantics 
of emotion-words themselves) not only accords due recognition to the role of 
embodied experience but can also provide better evidence of a culture’s 
phenomenology of emotion, getting us as close as we can get to a culture’s attempt to 
encapsulate subjective emotional experience in language.15 
A fundamental aspect of that phenomenology in the case of phrikē is its 
regular association with immediate, automatic, and instinctive responses to direct and 
often sudden visual or aural stimuli. The Aristotelian Problemata discuss phrikē as a 
spontaneous reaction to various unpleasant sounds (886b9-11, 964b34-37), a reflex 
that is then explicitly explained in terms of fear, on the basis that such sounds are 
instinctively regarded as signs of impending trouble (887a 1-3).16 This particular 
association between phrikē and immediate visual or aural stimuli is widely 
confirmed,17 and is reflected in the way that the adjective phrikōdēs very often 
qualifies sights and sounds: though many of these passages include a reference to the 
ominous connotations or negative import of the sights or sounds in question, it is clear 
that in many cases the adjective also highlights the capacity of the stimulus to elicit an 
instinctive emotional response. Plutarch, for example, uses phrikōdēs of the deep and 
horrific roar, the low and terrible tone, a mixture of bestial roaring and the clap of 
thunder, produced by the Parthians’ percussion instruments as they face the Romans 
in battle, commenting that the Parthians have clearly understood the impact of such 
sounds on the emotions and morale of their opponents (Crassus 23. 8-9).18 In the 
                                                 
15 Cf. Burkert 2010, 54. 
16 The relation of the startle reflex to the emotion of fear is similarly in question at 964b22-29, where 
the phrikē caused by being touched by another person is explained in terms of the fear aroused by what 
is sudden and unexpected. 
17 The link with vision is esp. frequent in Plutarch’s Lives: see Alexander 74. 6, Aratus 32. 3, Cicero 
49. 2, Marius 44. 9, Numa 10. 6; cf. phrissein and cognates + participle of a verb of seeing, e.g. 
Aeschylus, Supplices 346, Prometheus Vinctus 695. For phrikē as a reaction to loud, sudden, uncanny, 
or unexpected noises, cf. Cassius Dio Historia Romana 48. 37. 2 Boissevain (cf. 36. 49. 2); 
Philostratus, Heroicus 748. 14-17. 
18 Again, parallels are very numerous. See for example Euripides, Hippolytus 1201-2 (sounds of 
supernatural origin), 1215-16 (ditto), Andromache 1147-8 (ditto), Aristophanes, Frogs 1335-6 (ditto), 
[Aristotle], Mirabilium auscultationes 843a15-16 (the mere sight of waves in the Straits of Messina), 
Apollonius Rhodius 4. 1339-42 (sound as sign of danger), Plutarch, Marius 19. 1-20. 3 (the groans and 
lamentations of their defeated opponents echo through the hills at night and terrify the Romans), Sulla 
14. 3 (the sound of trumpets and horns; cf. Pollux 4. 85: phrikōdēs a good epithet for the sound of the 
trumpet), Josephus, Jewish Wars 4. 286-287 (thunder), 6. 2 (the sight of piles of corpses), 6. 83-84 (the 
sight of one centurion’s prodigious massacre of the enemy), Plutarch, Comparatio Lysandri et Sullae 2. 
Oedipus passage with which we began, the Chorus’ sudden shock at being confronted 
by the site of their once-revered king, now horribly mutilated, is fully in keeping with 
these connotations of phrikē. 
Phrikē’s associations with unexpected and unsettling visual stimuli, however, 
also make it an especially appropriate response to epiphany, quasi-epiphany, or other 
presumed signs of divine presence – another relevant aspect of our tragic passage, in 
which the Chorus’ questions focus specifically on the daimonic origins of Oedipus’ 
sufferings. A heavenly light, for example, occasions phrikē before the divine in 
Xenophon’s Cyropaedia (4. 2. 15),19 and phrikē is the reaction of the audience to the 
illusion of divine presence or possession created by the Sicilian statesman, Nicias, in 
Plutarch’s Life of Marcellus 20. 8.20 The relevant terms are also used of reactions to 
the supernatural communications believed to occur in dreams,21 or to a variety of 
miracles, portents, and omens.22 In such contexts, phrikē often connotes awe and 
deference as much as fear,23  and it is in this sense that sacred places, such as temples 
and shrines, are said to attract it.24 In connexion with the divine, then, phrikē  has as 
much to do with sebas, a type of awe or respect that responds to legitimate status and 
authority,25 as it does with simple fear of unpleasant consequences. It is in this respect 
                                                 
4 (the sight of slaughter), Lucian, Philopseudes 22 (the Gorgon-like aspect of a female monster), 
Achilles Tatius 3. 17. 7 (the sight of Leucippe emerging, mutilated but alive, from her coffin). In these 
phrikē-causing sights and sounds the element of fear, or at least of the unnerving or uncanny, is 
prominent; Greek writers seem not to present phrikē as a response to stirring or awe-inspiring sights or 
sounds (such as works of art or pieces of music) as such; contrast the subjects investigated by Schurtz 
et al. 2012, and cf. Keltner and Haidt 2003, 300-1, 303-4, 306-7.  
19 Cf. the shudders that respond to epiphany at Hesiod fr. 165. 4-5 M-W and to the divine sign from 
Zeus that marks Oedipus’ heroization at Oedipus Coloneus 1606-7, though in both these places the 
verb employed is rhigein. For the “holy shudder”, cf. esp. Burkert 2010, 50-4; also Keltner and Haidt 
2003, 298-9, 308-10 on awe and religion. Only a very small number of respondents in the survey of 
Schurtz et al. 2012 refer their goosepimples to religious experiences (p. 209); but (as the authors note, 
p. 210) this may simply reflect the limited scope for profound religious experiences in the lives of 
typical US college students over the four-week period of the survey. 
20 For phrikē in the context of quasi- or assumed epiphany (i.e. when the appearance or behaviour of a 
mortal suggests or is assimilated to epiphany), see Josephus, Jewish Antiquities 19. 344-345 (the quasi-
epiphany of Agrippa in the theatre), Plutarch, De Alexandri magni fortuna aut virtute 343E (the 
appearance of Alexander as quasi-epiphany), Aratus 32. 1-2 (a captive girl in a warrior’s helmet taken 
for an apparition of a goddess). 
21 See Josephus, Jewish Wars 3. 353, Plut. De superstitione 165F, Philostratus, Heroicus 666. 6-8, 
Achilles Tatius 5. 25. 4.  
22 Again, the basic phenomenon goes back to Homer (Iliad 12. 208-9, a physical shudder at the sight of 
an omen, though the verb there is rhigein), but Plutarch proves especially rich in instances: see 
Aemilius 17. 8 (eclipse), Agesilaus 24. 5 (daylight as quasi-divine sign, associated with Eleusis), Sulla 
11. 1 (an omen that takes place in the theatre), Timoleon 12. 9 (the phrikē and wonder, thauma, of the 
people of Adranum when, at the beginning of Timoleon’s battle against Hicetas of Leontini, the gates 
of their temple spontaneously flew open to reveal the cult-statue’s spear-tip trembling, sweat running 
down the god’s face). For “wonder” as a stock feature of epiphanies, often coupled with “fear”, see e.g. 
Homer, Iliad 3. 398, Odyssey 1. 322-3, 3. 372-3, 16. 178-9, 19. 36-40, Homeric Hymn to Apollo 134-
135, Homeric Hymn to Aphrodite 81-90; cf. Richardson 1974, 208-9; Faulkner 2008, 164. 
23 Cf. Cornutus, De natura deorum 11. 3-18; Julian, Contra Heracleium 8. 14-17, Epistulae 89b. 169-
75. 
24 See Demosthenes 23. 74 (of the Delphinion, the court with jurisdiction over justifiable homicide, qua 
holy place); Josephus, Jewish Wars 4. 181-182, 6. 123; Plutarch, Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus 21. 5; 
NB esp. Pollux 1. 23, where phrikōdēs appears after “august”, “god-filled”, and “numinous’ in a list of 
appropriate epithets for temples. This basic, instinctive response to the awesomeness of the numinous 
as such is attested (albeit with the verb rhigein) as early as the shudder with which Ajax looks upon the 
works of the gods at Iliad 16. 119-20. 
25 See Cairns 1993, 137-8, 157, 206-14. On occasion, phrikē can also express awe or deference towards 
human superiors (e.g. Euripides, Troades 1025-8, Plutarch Demosthenes 20. 3, De Alexandri magni 
that phrikē is associated with the institution of the oath, a ritual that publicly puts at 
stake the honour both of the human actors and its divine guarantors in an often 
elaborate and solemn ceremony involving prescribed roles and formulas. To be sure, 
in this context phrikē remains, at bottom, an instinctive and involuntary emotional 
response, but its association with the oath reminds us that such responses are regularly 
embedded in highly structured and specific cultural practices.26 A large number of 
passages from the Imperial Period and later make this link,27 but the association 
between the oath and the physical reaction that phrikē represents is as old as Greek 
literature itself, as we see in the case of Priam’s shudder (with the verb rhigein) in 
response to the request that he perform oath-sacrifice at Iliad 3. 259.28 To be sure, the 
oath entails frightening consequences in the event of its breach,29 but is also an 
institution in which status and prestige (Greek timē) is deeply implicated – that of the 
god is invested in the solemnity of the ritual itself and that of the human participants 
is committed to its maintenance. 
 Emotional phrikē, then, is not always fear or a symptom of fear; occasionally 
it can be associated with apparently quite different emotions,30 but even when it does 
belong with fear-like emotions its connotations can be more specific. Though it can 
be associated with institutions, rituals, and scenarios that are deeply embedded in 
specifically Greek cultural norms, it retains its basic rootedness in the body and its 
sensations, specifying an immediate, instinctive, and occurrent form of emotional 
experience. It is, one presumes, precisely in order to retain such connotations, to 
conjure up something of the experience of emotion rather than merely labelling it, that 
language makes use of metonyms of this sort in the first place. When Sophocles’ 
Chorus refer to the phrikē that Oedipus occasions in them, therefore, they are 
referring to an involuntary, physical response. This is a response such as one would 
feel if one were very cold, one that is allied to feelings of fear and revulsion 
occasioned, on the one hand, by the sudden and shocking sight of Oedipus’ physical 
mutilation, but also by their reflections upon actions which are at once the most 
                                                 
fortuna aut virtute 331F). On Eng. awe as a social emotion, and especially on its positive aspects, see 
Keltner and Haidt 2003, Schurtz et al. 2012, 210-16. For Keltner and Haidt 2003, 306-7 awe towards 
social superiors is the emotion’s “primordial” form, the application to elicitors in the natural world, art, 
or music a secondary development. Schurtz et al.’s investigation of the physical symptom of 
“goosebumps’ likewise concentrates on social factors (for which their respondents did indeed provide 
much evidence). But the rootedness of such symptoms in evolutionarily old capacities that humans 
share with other species might suggest a different evolutionary hypothesis, less specifically focused on 
human social hierarchies. 
26 Cf. the deliberate arousal of the initiand’s phrikē in mystic initiation, esp. at Plutarch fr. 178 
Sandbach (from On the Soul), a scenario that lies behind Plato’s account of the lover’s vision of Beauty 
Itself at Phaedrus 251a. As a response to the sanctity, solemnity, and power of the ritual, the link 
between phrikē and the mysteries is attested throughout antiquity and beyond: cf. Demetrius, De 
elocutione 101, Josephus, Jewish Wars 2. 133, Lucian, Juppiter tragoedus 30, Aristides, Hieroi logoi 
2, 297. 20-21 Jebb (cf. 256. 24, 320. 5).  Phrikōdēs and the like are frequently used in Christian 
writers’ representations of Christian dogma and practice, esp. the sacrament, as mysteries. 
27 See e.g. Philo Judaeus, De decalogo 141. 3, Josephus, Vita 275, BJ 2. 139, [Clement of Rome] 
Homiliae 5. 5. 2, Plutarch, Alexander 30.11, Arrian fr. 94. 2-3 Jacoby (with stress on sanctions for 
perjury), Pollux 1. 39, Cassius Dio, Historia Romana 8. 36. 29 Boissevain, Porphyry, De abstinentia 4. 
13, and so on into the writings of the Church Fathers and beyond (e.g. x 7 in John Chrysostom, x 4 in 
Palladius). 
28 Cf. rhigistē of the oath sworn by the Styx at Apollonius Rhodius 2. 291-2; more remotely, rhigistos 
of Zeus Hikesios, Apollonius Rhodius 2. 215. 
29 Cf. curses at Plutarch, Crassus 16. 7, Timoleon 5. 3, Philostratus, Lives of the Sophists 2, p. 599. 9-
11; magic spells: Lucian, Philopseudes 31. 
30 E.g. intense, quasi-erotic joy, at Sophocles, Ajax 693. 
heinous of transgressions and the most shocking indication of human vulnerability to 
suffering. That suffering is now compounded in a horrific act of self-mutilation which 
(the Chorus assume) must be divinely inspired, as were the parricide and incest that 
preceded it. Precisely because their description of their reaction conveys such a 
pronounced sense of its phenomenology, audiences ancient and modern attain a more 
vivid and immediate understanding of what it might be like to be in their shoes. This 
understanding may itself reinforce an analogous reaction on the audience’s part. 
 Some of the issues raised by this passage are addressed in Aristotle’s Poetics. 
In a characteristic passage of the important Chapter 14 (on the best type of tragic 
plot), Aristotle reflects on the importance of plot construction vis-à-vis visual 
spectacle (Poetics 14, 1453b1-7): 
 
ἔστιν μὲν οὖν τὸ φοβερὸν καὶ ἐλεεινὸν ἐκ τῆς ὄψεως γίγνεσθαι, ἔστιν δὲ καὶ ἐξ 
αὐτῆς τῆς συστάσεως τῶν πραγμάτων, ὅπερ ἐστὶ πρότερον καὶ ποιητοῦ 
ἀμείνονος. δεῖ γὰρ καὶ ἄνευ τοῦ ὁρᾶν οὕτω συνεστάναι τὸν μῦθον ὥστε τὸν 
ἀκούοντα τὰ πράγματα γινόμενα καὶ φρίττειν καὶ ἐλεεῖν ἐκ τῶν 
συμβαινόντων· ἅπερ ἂν πάθοι τις ἀκούων τὸν τοῦ Οἰδίπου μῦθον. 
 
Pity and fear can derive from the visual (opsis), but also from the arrangement 
of the incidents itself, which is preferable and the mark of a better poet. For 
the plot ought to be so composed that, even without seeing a performance, one 
who merely hears what happens will shudder and feel pity as a result of the 
events – as indeed one would on hearing the plot of the Oedipus.  
 
This passage contains the only instance of phrikē in the Poetics. The evidence 
considered above would suggest that Aristotle choses the verb phrissein over, say, 
phobeisthai (as one would expect given his repeated use of phobos and phoberos 
elsewhere in Poetics) precisely because the topic is the relative power of spectacle: 
that spectacle can produce phrikē is, given the term’s connotations, uncontroversial, 
but Aristotle wants to insist that even this quintessentially instinctive response to 
immediate and unexpected visual stimuli is better produced by means of the plot, for 
which performance is unnecessary. Aristotle’s example is the Oedipus Tyrannus, in 
which spectacle does play an important role in the phrikē expressed by the Chorus in 
the scene discussed above. As a practitioner, Sophocles might have wanted to insist 
on the interaction of plot and spectacle to a greater extent than Aristotle does. But the 
Chorus’ (and by extension the audience’s) response in the OT is clearly not simply a 
product of visual effects; it depends on a reflective evaluation of a structured series of 
actions that does indeed, in many respects, correspond to the pattern commended in 
this chapter of the Poetics. 
 Aristotle was not the first to give phrikē a role in poetics. At some point in the 
fifty years or so before Aristotle’s birth (in 484 BCE), the Sicilian philosopher and 
rhetorician, Gorgias, expressed what are, in some respects, similar ideas, in a playful 
composition written to demonstrate his ability to argue any case, even one as difficult 
as the exculpation of Helen of Troy.  Part of this case involves the argument that 
persuasive speech is irresistible (Helen 8-14), and the prime example of such 
persuasive speech is poetry (Helen 9):31  
 
                                                 
31 On this passage, see Segal 1962, esp. 105-7, 121-2, 124-5, 127-8, 131-2; Halliwell 2011, 274-5, 280-
1; cf. Heath 1987, 7; Munteanu 2012, 40-2. 
τὴν ποίησιν ἅπασαν καὶ νομίζω καὶ ὀνομάζω λόγον ἔχοντα μέτρον· ἧς τοὺς 
ἀκούοντας εἰσῆλθε καὶ φρίκη περίφοβος καὶ ἔλεος πολύδακρυς καὶ πόθος 
φιλοπενθής, ἐπ’ ἀλλοτρίων τε πραγμάτων καὶ σωμάτων εὐτυχίαις καὶ 
δυσπραγίαις ἴδιόν τι πάθημα διὰ τῶν λόγων ἔπαθεν ἡ ψυχή. 
 
All poetry I regard and describe as speech with metre. Into those who listen to 
it comes a fearful shuddering [phrikē] and a tearful pity and a longing that 
loves to lament, and at the success and failure of others’ affairs and persons 
the soul undergoes, through words, a certain experience of its own.  
 
Like Aristotle, Gorgias is concerned with an audience’s emotional engagement with 
the changing fortunes of others; his core emotional responses are Aristotle’s pity and 
fear; and he emphasizes the power of these emotions with reference to physical 
symptoms and expressions (tears and phrikē). But Gorgias differs from Aristotle in 
one explicit detail, in so far as he emphasizes the compulsive emotional power of 
opsis (Helen 15-19) as well as that of logos. Both, it emerges, persuade in similar 
ways: as the speech of astronomers persuades by making “what is incredible and 
obscure apparent to the eyes of opinion” (Helen 13), so opsis “engraves images of the 
objects of vision on the mind” (Helen 17).32 This difference of emphasis thus takes us 
back to Aristotle’s point: both seeing and hearing involve the formation of mental 
images, and thus poetic speech alone, without opsis, is perfectly capable of arousing 
in the hearer the kind of emotion that opsis might arouse in the spectator.33  
 Both Gorgias and Aristotle, in fact, draw on the implicit poetics of earlier, pre-
dramatic Greek poetry. In the Homeric poems, song is presented as something that 
derives from (Iliad 2. 484-7) or at least resembles (Odyssey 8. 491) eye-witness 
knowledge: Homer’s Demodocus was not present at Troy, and neither witnessed the 
events he narrates nor heard about them from someone who did; but someone who 
was present, Odysseus, is able to offer a unique guarantee of the bard’s powers of 
representation.34 That both audiences and authors revelled in such capabilities is 
demonstrated by the pervasive tradition of ekphrasis, the vivid, quasi-pictorial 
representation of a scene, person, animal, or object (not just a work of art) that 
appears already as a deliberate tour de force in the Shield of Achilles in Iliad 18. The 
capacity that allows a reader or hearer to form mental images from a verbal narrative 
the Greeks called phantasia and we call imagination; its counterpart in the text, and in 
the repertoire of skills which create the text, is enargeia (sometimes also emphasis or 
saphēneia), “vividness’.35  Enargeia remained an aspiration of wordsmiths and a core 
term of the literary and rhetorical critic’s art throughout antiquity, but for Greeks of 
all periods its unsurpassed master was Homer. An ancient scholar’s note on the 
famous passage of Iliad 6 in which Hector reaches out towards his baby son, only for 
the child to shrink back in fear at his helmet, is a typical example: “Children do cling 
to their nurses and are hard to wrench away from them. But in this case the sight 
                                                 
32 Cf. Halliwell 2011, 280-1; Munteanu 2012, 45-7. 
33 See Munteanu 2012, 47 on this passage and 95-100 on the importance of phantasia (imagination) in 
Aristotle’s approach to emotion, in everyday scenarios as well as in response to drama and poetry. On 
the truth of Aristotle’s insight, that emotional responses to imagined scenarios are as fundamental in 
life as in literature, cf. Currie and Ravenscroft 2002, 197. 
34 See De Jong 2001, 214-15; Serra 2007, 34; Halliwell 2011, 85-6. 
35 On ekphrasis, enargeia, and phantasia, see Webb 2009. On enargeia, see Zanker 1981; on 
phantasia, Rosenmeyer 1986; Watson 1988; Manieri 1998; Halliwell 2002, 308-12; Serra 2007. 
frightens him too. These lines are so full of enargeia that you don’t just hear what’s 
happening, you see it as well.”36  
 Though Gorgias and Aristotle stand – for us – at the beginning of the tradition 
of Greek literary aesthetics as a formal discipline, the tradition in which they 
themselves exist is already one which makes no absolute distinction between the 
effects of visual (dramatic) versus verbal representation. Although ancient Greek 
authors regularly comment on the greater power and persuasiveness of what one sees 
with one’s own eyes by comparison with what one merely hears about,37 it seems to 
have been an implicit ideal of Greek narrative to efface the distinction as far as 
possible. In both cases one’s powers of phantasia are engaged. In both, one’s 
response is typically emotional. And in both, the emotional response in question may 
have a pronounced somatic aspect that underlines the phenomenological continuity 
between narrative representations, dramatic representations, and the emotion-eliciting 
scenarios of everyday life. In all these respects, ancient aesthetics – both explicit and 
implicit, and especially the aesthetics of epic and tragic poetry – can be regarded as 
early contributions to current debate on a range of related issues: the central position 
of imagination among the cognitive capacities to which verbal and visual narratives 
appeal;38 the continuity between the cognitive and affective capacities enlisted by 
narratives and those that serve us in our quotidian lives as social creatures;39 the 
similarity between verbal and visual narratives in the way that they exploit these 
capacities;40 and on the role of the body in the affective responses of audiences.41 
The phantasia that is engaged by the enargeia of ancient Greek narratives 
takes a wide range of forms, both in theory and in practice; but its character, as 
emphasized by “Longinus’, the author of On the Sublime (15. 1-2), is typically 
emotional: one feels something like what a participant or an eye-witness would feel. 
The example that Longinus himself gives is of Orestes’ vision of the Erinyes in 
Euripides’ Orestes (255-7) and Iphigenia among the Taurians (291): only Orestes 
sees them, but the poet himself has imagined what Orestes sees, and thus succeeds in 
making the audience feel as though they see the Erinyes too. In this case, the 
                                                 
36 Σ bT on Iliad 6. 467. Cf. Richardson 1980, 277-80, with further examples; Snipes 1988 on similes; 
Bakker 2005; Slatkin 2007; Graziosi and Haubold 2010, 23-4. 
37 See e.g. Heraclitus B 101a DK, Herodotus 1. 8. 1, Xenophon, Memorabilia 3. 11. 1. It is 
characteristic that the Herodotus and Xenophon passages make use of the trope of the superiority of 
autopsy over hearsay in order to elicit by means of a verbal narrative a visualization of the primary 
viewing experienced by a figure in the narrative. On the Xenophon passage, cf. Goldhill 1998.  
38 See Tooby and Cosmides 2001; Currie and Ravenscroft 2002, 187-204; Boyd 2009, 47-8, 155-8, 
188-9, 197-8, 202-3, 382-3; Dutton 2009, 58-9, 103-14, 173, 200; J. Carroll et al. 2010; Smith 2011, 
109-11; Oatley 2011, 16-21 and passim.  
39 See e.g. Palmer 2004; Zunshine 2006; McConachie 2008; Boyd 2009, 141-9 and passim; Dutton 
2009; Currie 2010, esp. 93-106, 109-22, 199-216; Leverage et al. 2011; Oatley 2011; 2012, 154-62; 
Smith 2011, 111-13. 
40 See e.g. Plantinga 1999; Coplan 2006; Dutton 2009, 127-34; Smith 2011; more generally, the 
cognitive-science approach to fiction reflected in the works cited in n. [39] typically makes liberal use 
of both literary and cinematic narratives. 
41 Much of this research focuses on forms of emotional contagion, mimicry, and mirroring in response 
to facial expressions and other visible expressions of emotion: see e.g. Plantinga 1999; Smith 2003, 
265-6; Coplan 2006; McConachie 2008, 92-8; Boyd 2009, 103-4, 142, 163, 191-2; Smith 2011, 101-2; 
N. Carroll 2011, 178-80; Oatley 2011, 111-14. Decety and Meltzoff 2011 (among others) argue for a 
link between these phenomena and “mirror neurons’ (on which see Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia 2008; 
Iacoboni 2008, 2011).  For Coplan 2006, 35, such responses are possible only in response to direct 
sensory stimuli; but see Oatley 2011, 112 for evidence that blocking the reader’s facial expression 
inhibits emotional responses to written texts.  
audience’s emotion (the ekplēxis, ‘stunned amazement”,42 that Longinus regards as 
the typical outcome of poetic phantasia) arises from the poet’s imaginative recreation 
of the experience of the protagonist and his successful communication of that 
recreation to the audience. The example chosen is from drama; but stage performance, 
if it is presupposed at all, is not mentioned; all stress is on the words. 
In Plato’s Ion, the eponymous rhapsode eagerly expresses his assent to 
Socrates’ suggestion (Ion 535b-c) that those, like Ion himself, who perform the 
Homeric poems (and thus ‘stun” their audiences: ὅταν εὖ εἴπῃς ἔπη καὶ ἐκπλήξῃς 
μάλιστα τοὺς θεωμένους, 535b)43 are subject to a divinely inspired form of ecstasy, 
analogous to that of the inspired poet himself, that allows them to enter into the events 
that they narrate (Ion 535c): 
 
ἐγὼ γὰρ ὅταν ἐλεινόν τι λέγω, δακρύων ἐμπίμπλανταί μου οἱ ὀφθαλμοί· ὅταν 
τε φοβερὸν ἢ δεινόν, ὀρθαὶ αἱ τρίχες ἵστανται ὑπὸ φόβου καὶ ἡ καρδία πηδᾷ. 
 
For whenever I tell of a pitiable event, my eyes fill with tears; and whenever I 
narrate something frightening or terrible, my hair stands on end out of fear, 
and my heart leaps. 
 
Though the term phrikē is not used, this is what Ion’s piloerection points to.44 Ion 
himself makes no distinction between narrative and direct speech, but to the extent 
that the experiences he describes are appropriate to the characters portrayed in the 
poems that he performs, the substantial portion of the Homeric texts that is character-
speech is not an irrelevant consideration: in his delivery of both narrative and 
character-speech, Ion will be both narrator and performer; in both capacities, his 
recitation involves an element of identification with the poem’s characters in their 
reactions to the events narrated. In a very real sense, his physical presence as 
performer helps to suggest the phenomenology and physicality of the characters’ 
emotions.45 
Clearly, characters within a narrative can and do feel pity for others and fear 
for themselves; but these (especially pity) are also, already in Plato’s day, the 
characteristic emotional responses of audiences, as the passage from Gorgias’ Helen 
quoted above indicates.46 Accordingly, Ion’s emotional reaction is also that of the 
audience (535d-e): 
 
Σω.  οἶσθα οὖν ὅτι καὶ τῶν θεατῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς ταὐτὰ ταῦτα ὑμεῖς 
ἐργάζεσθε; 
Ιων.  καὶ μάλα καλῶς οἶδα· καθορῶ γὰρ ἑκάστοτε αὐτοὺς ἄνωθεν ἀπὸ τοῦ 
βήματος κλάοντάς τε καὶ δεινὸν ἐμβλέποντας καὶ συνθαμβοῦντας τοῖς 
λεγομένοις. 
 
Soc. So do you realize that you rhapsodes produce these same effects on 
most of the spectators too?  
                                                 
42 On ekplēxis, see Halliwell 2011, 229-31 (on Aristotle), 332 (on Longinus); see also Heath 1987, 15-
16; like phrikē, this term is instructive on the phenomenology, and especially on the perceived 
intensity, of the emotions experienced by poetic audiences. 
43 On this passage, cf. Halliwell 2002, 213-14 n. 19. 
44 On the link between this passage and Gorgias, Helen 9, cf. Halliwell 2002, 77 n. 14, 218. 
45 Cf. Halliwell 2002, 80. 
46 Cf. Heath 1987, 11-16; Halliwell 2002 passim, esp. 100, 208-13, 218-19; Munteanu 2012. 
Ion.  Yes, I am very well aware of that: every time it happens I look down 
on them from the platform above and see them weeping, with fear in their 
eyes, sharing my amazement at what’s said. 
 
The passage is thus subject to several tensions: Ion is a narrator of the actions of 
others, but also (especially, one might think, when performing direct character-
speech) something like an actor, engaging in direct representation of the story’s 
characters. At the same time, Ion himself embodies aspects of an audience’s reaction 
to the doings and sufferings of the characters. The audience’s reaction mirrors his, but 
it is not clear whether the response of either Ion or his audience is (to borrow terms 
from Keith Oatley) an empathetic one (feeling with), in which the audience identifies 
emotionally with the characters and recreates, at least to some extent, their first-
person perspective, or a sympathetic, third-person response (feeling for) in which the 
audience experiences distinct emotions of its own, elicited by but not identical to the 
emotions of the characters.47 The issues which might interest us in this regard remain 
largely unexplored, because the dialogue’s explicit emphasis is elsewhere: on the 
status of poetry as a third-hand derivative of reality (535a); on its negative effects on 
audiences (535d); and on its inability, as a form of inspiration rather than a skill 
(536a-d), to give a rational account of its subject-matter (536e-542a). 
  A striking incident in Josephus’ narrative of Rome’s Jewish wars raises 
similar issues. During the siege of Jerusalem, a starving woman cooks and eats her 
own son in a desperate attempt to avenge herself upon the Jewish guards whose 
depredations have reduced her to this level; the guards who see what she has done are 
transfixed with horror, phrikē, at the sight (τοὺς δ’ εὐθέως φρίκη καὶ παρέκστασις 
ᾕρει καὶ παρὰ τὴν ὄψιν ἐπεπήγεσαν, BJ 6. 210),48 but as the news spreads through the 
city, all those who hear it visualize and shudder at the event as if they had committed 
it themselves (καὶ πρὸ ὀμμάτων ἕκαστος τὸ πάθος λαμβάνων ὥσπερ αὐτῷ τολμηθὲν 
ἔφριττε, 6. 213). The internal auditors recreate the act in their mind’s eye; their 
powers of phantasia lend the event a vividness that elicits the same kind of 
spontaneous, involuntary, and physical response as was experienced by those who 
actually did witness it. The reaction of the eye-witnesses is one of horror and 
revulsion; but the secondary audience, in some sense, imagines something of what it 
would be like to perpetrate such a thing. There is still revulsion, but the suggestion of 
putting oneself in the place of Mary, the perpetrator, facilitates another response, of 
sympathy. Accordingly, when the news reaches the Romans, though some are 
incredulous and many filled with even greater loathing for the Jews than they had 
hitherto felt, others feel pity (6. 214). Josephus’ wider narrative of the episode 
concentrates on the extremes of suffering to which human beings can be reduced (6. 
201-5, 213) and presents Mary herself a victim of others’ greed and cruelty (6. 202), 
her cannibal feast a desperate protest against their inhumanity (6. 207, 211). Thus the 
imaginative identification with Mary that is attributed to those who first hear the 
report of her deed and the pity that is the response of at least some of the Romans act 
as cues for the responses that Josephus’ vivid and artfully constructed narrative is 
intended to arouse in its readers. The emotions of the latter, then, are guided first of 
all by the vividness of the narrative itself, then by the responses of internal eye-
witnesses, and then by two distinct sets of internal auditors. In this case, though (at 6. 
                                                 
47 For the terms, see Oatley 2011, 115-20; on empathy versus sympathy cf. various authors in Coplan 
and Goldie 2011. 
48 παρέκστασις (found in one MS and printed by Niese) occurs only here; all other MSS (and 
testimonia) have φρενῶν ἔκστασις.  
213) the internal audience’s picturing of themselves in the agent’s shoes has a strong 
emotional component, this does not entail feeling what the agent felt, but rather 
recreating the agent’s point of view as part of a third-person response to the act – all 
the emotional responses adumbrated in the text (whether horror, revulsion, hatred, or 
pity) are third-person, onlookers’ responses, and so is the hypothetical sympathy of 
the reading audience.49 
It is common (and correct) to emphasize the influence of the theatre, and 
specifically of tragedy, on such passages (see Chapman 2007), but as we have seen 
the vivid presentation of action and emotion as if before the eyes of a listening or 
reading public is a staple of Greek poetics and rhetoric from their very beginnings. 
The centrality of pity to an audience’s responses to serious poetry, too, is implicit in 
the poetics of the Iliad and explicit in the earliest formulations of Greek philosophical 
poetics. The ability to feel this pity, according to Aristotle in the Rhetoric, depends on 
a sense of the vulnerability that we share with those who are suffering (Rhetoric 2. 8, 
1385b13-33, 1386a25-29). Similarly self-referential is the fear that in both Poetics 
and Rhetoric is said to derive from the sense that such things might also happen to us 
(Poetics 13, 1453a4-6; cf. Rhetoric 1386b27-29, where the things we pity in others 
are said to be the kind of things that we fear may happen to ourselves).50 Shared 
vulnerability to vicissitude is a condition for pity both in traditional Greek ethics and 
in the implicit aesthetics of poetic texts. The locus classicus is the encounter between 
Achilles and Priam in Iliad 24. 485-551, in which Priam appeals to Achilles to release 
his son’s body for burial. Priam first seeks to elicit Achilles’ sympathy by comparing 
himself with Achilles’ own father, but Achilles realizes that the parallel is in fact 
closer than Priam suggests. As a result, he goes on to deliver an elaborate speech of 
consolation in which he presents suffering as the lot of all mankind, using both Priam 
and his own father as examples of great felicity undercut by extreme suffering in old 
age.51 Among several salient and authoritative statements of the same principle in 
(especially Sophoclean) tragedy, 52 Odysseus’ reflections on the madness and 
degradation of his enemy, Ajax, are perhaps the most memorable. The goddess 
Athena, who has deflected on to the army’s flocks Ajax’s murderous attack on the 
Greek leaders, toys with her humiliated victim and invites his rival, Odysseus, to 
gloat. But Odysseus takes an entirely different view (Ajax 121-6): 
 
    ἐποικτίρω δέ νιν 
δύστηνον ἔμπας, καίπερ ὄντα δυσμενῆ, 
ὁθούνεκ’ ἄτῃ συγκατέζευκται κακῇ, 
οὐδὲν τὸ τούτου μᾶλλον ἢ τοὐμὸν σκοπῶν. 
ὁρῶ γὰρ ἡμᾶς οὐδὲν ὄντας ἄλλο πλὴν    125 
εἴδωλ’ ὅσοιπερ ζῶμεν ἢ κούφην σκιάν. 
 
[What you say is true,] but nonetheless I pity him in his misfortune, even 
though he is my enemy, because he is yoked to dire ruin. In this I look out for 
                                                 
49 On pity as characteristic of an observer’s perspective, see Halliwell 2002, 215-16; cf. also Konstan 
2001 (with Cairns 2004) on classical pity and emotional distance. 
50 On the role of fear for oneself in Aristotle’s conception of pity see Konstan 2001, 130-6 with Cairns 
2004, 66-7; on the relation of pity to fear in Aristotle’s conception of tragic emotion, see Halliwell 
1986, 168-202; 2002, 216-18. 
51 On the importance of this passage and its ethos in the Greek narrative tradition, see Cairns 2014. 
52 Cf. Philoctetes 501-6, Oedipus Coloneus 566-8; Euripides, Hecuba 282-7. Beyond tragedy see 
Bacchylides 5. 155-62 (esp. 160-2 and cf. 89-92); Herodotus 1. 86. 6, 7. 46. 2; cf. Pelling 2005, 289, 
291-2 on Plutarch.  
my own situation no less than his, for I see that all of us who are alive are 
nothing more than apparitions or fleeting shadow. 
 
Similarly, in the Oedipus Tyrannus, the pity that the Chorus and others feel, 
despite their revulsion, for Oedipus, complements the Chorus’s authoritative 
presentation (in the fourth stasimon) of his career as a paradigm of the shared human 
vulnerability on which pity rests, and is thus crucial in guiding and conditioning the 
response of an external audience.53 The same seems to me to be true of their phrikē in 
the passage with which we began – their horror at Oedipus’ suffering is a prerequisite 
for the recognition that his suffering differs in degree but not in kind from that which 
might befall any of us. The use of phrikē of a response that is both sympathetic and 
fearful is apparent in other passages. In Sophocles’ Trachiniae, for example, the 
leader of the female Chorus deploys the term in her response to Heracles’ sufferings 
in the poisoned shirt of Nessus (1044-5): 
 
κλύουσ’ ἔφριξα τάσδε συμφοράς, φίλαι, 
ἄνακτος, οἵαις οἷος ὢν ἐλαύνεται. 
 
I shudder when I hear our king suffering like this, friends; what terrible 
afflictions for a man like him.  
 
So too do the female Chorus in expressing their sympathy for the persecuted cow-
maiden, Io, at Prometheus Bound 687-95: 
 
 ἔα ἔα, ἄπεχε, φεῦ· 
οὔποθ’ <ὧδ’> οὔποτ’ ηὔχουν ξένους  
μολεῖσθαι λόγους ἐς ἀκοὰν ἐμάν, 
οὐδ’ ὧδε δυσθέατα καὶ δύσοιστα    690 
†πήματα λύματα δείματ’ 
ἀμφήκει κέντρῳ ψύχειν ψυχὰν ἐμάν†.54 
ἰὼ [ἰὼ] μοῖρα μοῖρα, 
πέφρικ’ εἰσιδοῦσα πρᾶξιν Ἰοῦς.    695 
 
Ah, keep away, oh! I never, ever thought that words so strange would come to 
my hearing, or that sufferings, outrages, terrors so hard to look at and to bear 
would chill my soul with double-pronged goad. Ah, fate, fate, I shudder as I 
behold Io’s plight.  
 
The movements and gestures that accompanied Io’s opening words at 561-88 will 
have made her physical torment visible to both the internal and external audiences. In 
the ensuing scene, and especially in the narrative of her persecution at 640-86, she 
emphasizes her sufferings and presents herself as an appropriate recipient of pity; 
indeed, pity is a response that she herself expects (684-5). The leader of the Chorus of 
                                                 
53 Pity: 1194, 1211, 1216-21, 1286, 1296, 1299, 1303, 1347; revulsion: esp. the Chorus at 1217-18, 
1297-9, 1303-6, 1348, all, significantly, associated in context with their pity; cf. Creon at 1424-31. On 
the “hermeneutic” function of the choral voice in the fourth stasimon, see e.g. Calame 1999, 139; for 
the same general phenomenon (internal audience response guiding external) in Plutarch, see Pelling 
2005, 282-3. 
54 The transmitted text is unsatisfactory for metrical and syntactic reasons, but the sense is not seriously 
in doubt. 
Oceanids has specifically requested the “pleasure” of a full report of Io’s sufferings 
(631-4), and the Chorus’s pity is cued when Prometheus then encourages her to 
comply, on the grounds that “to weep away and lament away one’s misfortunes is 
worth the effort, when one is likely to win a tear from listeners’ (638-9). The audience 
is thus primed to see the Chorus’s response as sympathetic, and they are not deceived 
– the Chorus do recognize the extremity of Io’s situation.55 But the sympathy that is 
implicit in that recognition is also mixed with personal distress. Like the Chorus of 
Sophocles’ Oedipus, with whom we began, the sufferings of another person both 
compel their attention and overwhelm them, so that they can hardly bear to 
contemplate the other’s pain.56 In this passage, understanding of another’s emotional 
distress produces self-focused anxiety more obviously than other-concern – there is 
pity, but also fear.57 
Both Heracles and Io are onstage; the Choruses in question respond to 
sufferings presented before their eyes and compounded by the lamentations of their 
patients. But similar responses can also be attributed to characters within a verbal 
narrative, as in the case of two passages in Plutarch’s Life of Aemilius Paullus. The 
Homeric theme of the mutability of fortune is central both to this Life and to the pair 
that it forms with the Life of Timoleon;58 the specific debt to Homer in the Life of 
Aemilius in particular is advertised at the emotional climax of the work (34. 8), where 
Plutarch narrates the reversal that struck Aemilius at the very pinnacle of his success. 
Aemilius is the conqueror of Perseus, the last of Alexander’s successors as king of 
Macedonia, but the triumph in which this crucial stage in Rome’s rise to dominance is 
celebrated is undercut by the death of two of the general’s sons, aged 14 and 12, one 
five days before the triumph and the other three days after it. For the narrator, this is 
the work of that daemonic force, whatever it may be, whose business it is to ensure 
“that no one’s life should be unsullied or without admixture of trouble, but that, as 
Homer says, those may be regarded as best off whose fortunes shift in the balance, 
now this way, now that”. For the Roman people, however, the vulnerability of all 
human beings to vicissitude is occasion for phrikē: they “all shudder at the cruelty of 
Fortune, that she did not scruple to introduce so much sorrow into a household so 
admired, so full of joy and sacrifices, or to mix laments and tears together with 
victory paeans and triumphs’ (φρῖξαι τὴν ὠμότητα τῆς τύχης ἅπαντας, ὡς οὐκ 
ᾐδέσατο πένθος τοσοῦτον εἰς οἰκίαν ζήλου καὶ χαρᾶς καὶ θυσιῶν γέμουσαν 
εἰσάγουσα, καὶ καταμειγνύουσα θρήνους καὶ δάκρυα παιᾶσιν ἐπινικίοις καὶ 
θριάμβοις).59 This vulnerability is explicitly a phenomenon that unites the victors and 
the vanquished: Aemilius’ defeated opponent, Perseus, is as much a paradigm of the 
mutability of fortune as is Aemilius himself (26. 4-12, 27. 4-5, 33. 6-8, 37. 2). The 
vulnerability that is demonstrated by military defeat is similarly the focus of phrikē at 
                                                 
55 Cf. Griffith 1983, 211: the lyrics “give voice to the horror and sympathy which the audience must by 
now feel”. 
56 For this reaction, cf. Decety and Meltzoff 2011, 76; Hoffman 2011, 250-1 (in Coplan and Goldie’s 
2011 collection on empathy). 
57 Griffith 1983, 212, and Podlecki 2005, 182, both note that the rhythms of the choral lyric in 687-95 
are similar to those of Io’s entrance-song at 566-608  – a formalized representation of emotional 
mirroring? 
58 See Swain 1989; Tatum 2010; Cairns 2014. 
59 On this passage, see. Pelling 2005, 209, and cf. 280-3 on quasi-tragic narrative patterns in Plutarch’s 
Lives. Among pre-Christian (non-medical) authors Plutarch is by far the most prolific user of phrikē-
words (143 instances of the noun; 43 uses of cognate terms). The qualities of phrikē, as I have outlined 
them above, chime very well with his predilection for vivid narrative, dramatic changes of fortune, and 
moralizing on the ways in which his subjects’ lives exemplify recurrent human types and patterns. 
Aemilius 29. 5: booty from the sack of the cities of Epirus produces no more than 
eleven drachmas per solider, so that “everyone shuddered at the outcome of the war, 
that the division of an entire nation’s wealth should yield so little profit and gain for 
each individual” (φρῖξαι δὲ πάντας ἀνθρώπους τὸ τοῦ πολέμου τέλος, εἰς μικρὸν οὕτω 
τὸ καθ’ ἕκαστον λῆμμα καὶ κέρδος ἔθνους ὅλου κατακερματισθέντος). 
In each of these four cases, the dramatic and the narrative, phrikē responds to 
the misfortunes of others, uniting both the fearful sense that we ourselves are as 
vulnerable as they are and a sympathy that is born of that very recognition. This union 
of fear for oneself and sympathy for others, together with the central focus of these 
emotions on the mutability of fortune, echoes some of the central tenets of Aristotle’s 
theory in the Poetics, demonstrating how widespread these assumptions are in Greek 
literary culture. In each of these cases, too, an internal audience experiences an 
emotional reaction with all the phenomenological connotations of phrikē that we have 
explored above, a reaction that is clearly meant to stand in some relation to the 
potential responses of the external audience. Internal and external audiences in some 
sense feel the same emotion. But it does not seem to be true to suggest that the 
external audience is catching the phrikē of the internal or that the latter is caused by 
former. The conditions that evoke the phrikē of the internal audience are clearly 
sufficient to evoke the same feeling in the external audience, and the emotional 
response of the internal audience is in no way the focus on which the emotion of the 
external audience rests. The external audience is not feeling with the internal, 
imaginatively simulating or reconstructing their first-person response. These are third-
person, onlookers’ responses in each case; the external audience replicates the 
response of the internal, but each remains the response of an audience to the 
emotional plight of a third party. In so far as the emotions of internal and external 
audiences are the same, this is a matter of their converging on the same object, though 
it is entirely possible that the emotion of the internal audience may serve to prime, 
focus, or reinforce the response of the external audience. 60 In this respect, the reaction 
of a character or a Chorus in tragedy or the point of view of a character in a narrative 
operate, in a sense, like the point-of-view or reaction shot in cinema – the eliciting 
conditions for the relevant emotional response are contextually and situationally 
established, but the facial expressions of onlookers prime and steer the audience’s 
reactions to those elicitors.61 The phrikē of an internal audience in tragedy or in 
narrative constitutes a reflection, in the text itself, of the relation of the text and its 
performance to an audience; it offers a perspective on the text’s emotion-eliciting 
power. 
                                                 
60 On the general issues here, see N. Carroll 2011. 
61 On the cinematic technique and its implications, see Plantinga 1999; Coplan 2006; Smith 2011; N. 
Carroll 2011, 179. On point of view more generally as a form of priming or framing, see Currie 2010, 
87-107, 123-66. A substantial difference between classical tragedy and modern cinema in this respect 
is that the latter, given large screen projection and pervasive use of close-ups of facial expressions, 
offers (at the least) much more scope for emotional contagion. Tragedy is masked, gesture was 
probably stylized, and the size of the theatre also makes a substantial difference. For the dependence of 
emotional contagion (unconscious mimicry and feedback) on “direct sensory input” see Coplan 2006, 
35 and cf. n. [41] above. 
Empathy is a slippery and multivalent term.62 But if, as some claim,63 it 
requires the adoption of another person’s first-person perspective and/or experiencing, 
from that first-person perspective, the emotions that another person feels, then the 
external audiences of the ancient Greek dramas and narratives that we are considering 
do not empathize with these internal figures whose point of view helps to steer their 
responses: the internal viewer feels phrikē, and the external audience may feel phrikē, 
but the latter’s phrikē is not a matter of their identifying with or being affected by the 
emotional reaction of an internal focalizer. Nor is the ideal response of an external 
audience typically represented as empathy with the focal characters whose suffering 
elicits the phrikē of both internal and external audiences. Though there is regularly, as 
we have seen, an element of generalization that extrapolates from the suffering of the 
character to the kind of thing that might happen to anyone, and though one might 
adopt a view of the sufferer as a human being like oneself, still the characters’ 
experience is not that of their audiences, internal or external. They are suffering; 
Choruses, focalizing characters, and external audiences do not feel what they are 
feeling, but feel, as Gorgias so aptly put it, “a certain experience of their own”, not 
(for example) anguish, grief, remorse, or shame, but (for example) fear, pity, or 
phrikē.64 To be sure, characters in a drama or a narrative can be afraid, shiver, or 
shudder, and an audience may do so along with them – this is perhaps an element in 
the passage from Plato’s Ion considered above. But this is not the type of response 
that is considered characteristic of poetic audiences: when phrikē appears as an 
aesthetic emotion, it is typically an observer’s response, not a vicarious first-person 
one. It is not, in Sophocles, Oedipus’ phrikē that elicits that of the Chorus or the 
audience, and even those who, in Josephus’ narrative, imaginatively recreate Mary’s 
cannibal feast before their eyes, as if they themselves were its perpetrators, 
nonetheless react to the event in a way that Mary herself did not. As Halliwell puts it 
(2002, 216): “When we feel pity, we do not share the sufferer’s subjectivity: however 
much we may draw emotionally near to it, or move vicariously with its psychological 
expression, we remain, qua feelers of pity, outside the immediate, ‘first-person’ 
reality of the pain, whether physical or mental.” This is a significant fact about 
ancient Greek aesthetic and poetic theory. Though contemporary approaches also 
have much to say about sympathetic responses of this sort, it is also typical for them 
to emphasize the potential for identificatory or empathetic responses of various sorts, 
to a much greater extent than do ancient Greek texts, which make no grand claims 
about feeling what other people feel.65  
Phrikē is by no means ubiquitous as a tragic emotion, but nonetheless, when it 
occurs in that connection, it is informative about the nature of tragic emotions. 
Though typically a symptom of fear, horror, or revulsion, it can be an expression of 
that link between these emotions and the shared sense of vulnerability that gives rise 
to pity. Its nature as an involuntary, instinctive response especially to immediate 
visual and aural stimuli, together with its fundamentally somatic character, help us to 
                                                 
62 A complaint of several contributors to Coplan and Goldie 2011 (see pp. xxxi, 4, 31-2, 103, 162-3, 
211, 319); cf. Stueber 2012, 55. 
63 Hoffman 2011, 231; Engelen and Röttger-Rössler 2012, 4; Walter 2012, 10; Preston and Hofelich 
2012, 26; Bischof-Köhler 2012, 40-1. Cf. Giovanelli 2008 and 2009 on empathetic identification as an 
element in sympathy, with criticism by N. Carroll 2011, 180-4. 
64 On the echo of Gorgias’s formulation (others’ affairs arouse an emotion that is one’s own, Helen 9) 
in Plato’s Republic (606b), see Halliwell 2002, 77; 2011, 267 n. 9. 
65 For scepticism about “empathy”, in so far as it is said to involve emotional matching, feeling the 
emotions of others, simulating others’ mental states, and so on, cf. N. Carroll 2011; Goldie 2011, 302-3 
and passim; McFee 2011, 193, 197, 201; Morton 2011, 319, 325. 
put some phenomenological flesh upon the bare bones of “pity and fear” as the typical 
tragic emotions. Its immediacy, in turn, and especially its association with the visual, 
can serve to illustrate the premium placed on vividness and visuality by authors, 
consumers, and theorists of ancient Greek narratives, and thus also illustrates the 
continuity between narrative and dramatic genres as objects of ancient literary theory.  
Though actors as well as observers can experience phrikē as a response to the 
terrifying or horrific, what we might call “tragic” phrikē tracks the tragic emotions of 
pity and fear as characteristically third-person, observers’ responses to suffering, and 
thus corroborates the general emphasis of ancient Greek aesthetics on sympathy over 
empathy, on feeling for rather than feeling with. But although in this way (and in 
many others) the concept of phrikē is deeply enmeshed in the cultural specifics of 
ancient Greek societies, it nonetheless possesses a core that cannot be relativized, a 
rootedness in the physicality of human emotion and an origin in our pre-human 
biological inheritance; when the Chorus express their phrikē at Oedipus’ self-
blinding, we know what they mean. This is the difference that phrikē’s 
phenomenological richness makes: even if (and this is debatable) such a full-blooded, 
somatic response is less frequent in our own emotional repertoire as readers, theatrical 
audience-members, or cinema-goers (or if our cultures have taught us to find our 
frissons in somewhat different aspects of the relevant art-forms), still we all know 
what it is like to shudder or shiver; and thus we can approach, at least to some degree, 
something of the characteristic emotional tone at which ancient authors were aiming.  
Whatever he meant by the enigmatic term catharsis,66 Aristotle clearly 
thought that the experience of such intense emotion in the audiences of Attic tragedy 
or Homeric epic was both pleasurable and somehow beneficial for the individual 
audience member. Gorgias agreed at least on the paradoxical pleasure to be had from 
the encounter with others’ suffering. Modern accounts of the pull exerted by fictional 
representations in a variety of media are beginning to emphasize their capacity-
building qualities, their power to flex our imaginative muscles, to develop the 
cognitive capacities on which social interaction depends, and to extend and deepen 
our emotional repertoires. Such effects, notoriously, are not automatic; but they do at 
least seem to be possible.67 The inclusion of phrikē in the emotional repertoire of 
ancient audiences does not in itself resolve any of the issues regarding the effects of 
emotional engagement with drama and narrative, but what it tells us about the 
character of that engagement itself suggests at least the possibility that emotional 
experiences of such immediacy and intensity played an important role in developing 
audiences’ capacity to feel for others, and so to understand themselves. 
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66 An unanswerable question, and so I do not pursue it here. For a recent (and inconclusive) review of 
the main avenues of interpretation, see Munteanu 2012, 238-50. 
67 For empirical evidence in support of the notion that fiction builds capacity in other-understanding 
and emotional intelligence, see Oatley 2011, 156-75; cf. Oatley 2012, esp. 121-6, 159-62, 184-8. For 
the general position, cf. Tooby and Cosmides 2001; J. Carroll 2006; Zunshine 2006; Boyd 2009, esp. 
188-208; Dutton 2009, 109-26; Smith 2011, esp. 109-11. 
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